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D 
orothy Grover outlines the prosentential theory of 
truth in which truth predicates have an anaphoric 
function that is analogous to pronouns, where 
anaphoric is defined as obtaining meaning from an 
antecedent. There is no distinct property of truth because the 
word “true” cannot be separated from its function in 
prosentences. All prosentences contain the phrase “…is true” 
and occupy the position that declarative sentences occupy in 
language. Robert Brandom expresses the prosentential theory of 
truth by asserting that the phrase “…is true” acts as a 
prosentence forming operator. Grover wants to assert that it is 
not necessary to be deflationary about reference in order to be 
deflationary about truth. Brandom, however, believes that a 
pronominal theory of reference follows from the prosentential 
theory of truth.  
I argue that the prosentential theory of truth must accept the 
pronominal theory of reference in order to maintain an 
anaphoric account of truth. I call the theory that encompasses the 
prosentential theory of truth and the pronominal theory of 
reference anaphoric deflationism because truth and reference are 
described as anaphoric linguistic tools in order to demonstrate 
that these concepts are not metaphysical properties. I also 
explicate a modification to the anaphoric deflationist‟s account of 
truth and reference by explaining that the words “truth” and 
“reference” have anaphoric functions in the same way “true” 
and “refers” have anaphoric functions. This strengthens the 
argument against substantive truth and reference properties by 
accounting for these words as having only intralinguistic 
meaning. 
 
I. Dorothy Grover and the Prosentential Theory of 
Truth 
The prosentential theory of truth as presented by Dorothy 
Grover explains the use of the word “true” in language in terms 
of prosentences. Prosentences are related to sentences in the 
same way pronouns are related to pronouns. Both prosentences 
Anaphoric Deflationism: Truth and Reference 
LAUREN HARTZELL 
 
18 
and pronouns belong to the larger class of proforms, which are 
used to obtain generality. On this account, the word “true” has 
no meaning apart from its function in prosentences. Truth talk 
therefore only requires a truth predicate (i.e. prosentences), but 
no truth property. All truth talk can be expressed in terms of a 
prosentential reading of “true” and “false.” Prosentences are not 
redundant because they serve an anaphoric function, but they 
are content redundant because of the nature of anaphors. An 
anaphor is a word, phrase or sentence that obtains meaning by 
referring to a preceding word or group of words. Prosentences 
obtain meaning from preceding statements, making them 
anaphors. It is important to identify this referring relationship as 
intralinguistic (as opposed to extralinguistic) because this 
distinguishes anaphors as having an indirect relationship to their 
original referent. Thus, prosentences as anaphors are inheritors 
of meaning; they acquire their referent from another expression. 
Grounded inheritors have referents that acquire propositional 
content independently. Therefore, prosentences are grounded 
only when their anaphoric referents have propositional content, 
and they can acquire propositional content only indirectly 
through their referents.1  
 The two categories of prosentences are “lazy” 
prosentences such as “that is true” and quantificational 
prosentences such as “it is true.” Both versions of prosentences 
can be expressed in different forms because their verbs can be 
modified and their subjects can be manipulated. Prosentences 
involving the phrase “that is true” are easily seen as functioning 
in the same way as pronouns. This type of prosentence is 
analogous to a pronoun of laziness. The phrase “that is true” is 
used as an anaphoric substitute to other phrases or sentences. 
Consider the following: 
 
Marion:  Most college students do not get enough sleep.  
Robert: That is true, but you have to recognize that 
such generalizations do not apply to all 
students. I always make an effort to get nine 
hours of sleep.  
 
In this example Robert did not want to repeat everything Marion 
said, so he summarized her statement by saying “that is true.” It 
is important to note that the phrase “that is true” is a prosentence 
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that holds the place of another content filled sentence. “That is 
true” is an anaphor with the referent “Most college students do 
not get enough sleep.”  Robert‟s prosentence is a simplified 
placeholder for Marion‟s statement in an analogous way to “she” 
being a placeholder for Marion in the following sentences about 
Marion. Marion loves to volunteer her time at the Children’s Hospital. 
She is a very compassionate woman. “That is true” is a prosentence 
of laziness in the same way “she” is a pronoun of laziness. 
Prosentences of laziness do not assert, deny, or consider 
anything new. The fact that they are content redundant 
illustrates their role in language. They are an anaphoric 
mechanism just as pronouns are anaphoric mechanisms.  
 Quantificational prosentences involve the phrase “it is 
true.” These prosentences are used to generalize sentence 
positions much like pronouns are used to generalize nominal 
positions. The phrase “it is true” is used to corroborate its 
antecedent even though it is content redundant with this 
antecedent because it is an anaphor of the antecedent. In, She is 
Lexi, the pronoun “she” refers to Lexi. “She” is anaphorically 
connected to “Lexi.” In this case the subject and object refer to 
the same physical thing, but the subject, “she,” is related to the 
object, “Lexi,” by an intralinguistic relationship. “Lexi,” 
however, has an extralinguistic relationship with Lexi the person. 
Similarly in, it is true that Lexi loves ice cream, the prosentence “it 
is true” has as its antecedent the very statement it is supporting. 
In this case, “it is true” refers to Lexi‟s love of ice cream, making 
“Lexi loves ice cream” its antecedent referent. “It is true” is not 
redundant because it serves to emphasize the statement “Lexi 
loves ice cream.” It is, however, content redundant.  
Quantificational prosentences are able to emphasize or 
justify because they can have more complex antecedents than the 
antecedents with which they are presented. The reason the use of 
the phrase “it is true” is a prosentence is that it acts as a 
placeholder for all the possible justifications of the primary 
sentence. Consider the following: 
 
 Robert: It is true that water is composed of H20. 
 Marion: Is that really true? How do you know that? 
Robert: Scientists have proven it experimentally; that 
is how I know it is true.  
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The reason Robert does not simply say that water is composed of 
H2O is because he wants to indicate that he is justified in making 
his statement. The original antecedent of “It is true” is “water is 
composed of H2O.” When pressed about how he knows this, 
Robert admits that it is because scientists have proven water to 
be composed of H2O that he claimed the statement to be “true.” 
The prosentence “it is true” has a more complex antecedent in 
Robert‟s second statement that includes the original antecedent 
in addition to “Scientists have proven it experimentally.” When a 
statement aligns with one‟s knowledge, the phrase “it is true” 
can be attached to the statement to indicate that such knowledge 
exists. The stated antecedent and referent to the prosentence can 
be expanded to include the other knowledge about the 
statement. Quantificational prosentences, therefore, are more 
complex anaphoric mechanisms than lazy prosentences. They 
appear redundant because their simple anaphoric referents are 
presented at the same time as the prosentence, but are not 
redundant because they imply the possibility of more complex 
referents.  
In this light, quantificational prosentences can be seen as 
analogous to lazy prosentences. “It is true” acts as a placeholder 
in the same way “that is true” acts as a placeholder. The 
difference is that “that is true” refers to a specific antecedent, 
while “it is true” refers to a specific antecedent that can be 
expanded to include other knowledge statements. All 
prosentences keep discussions involving truth predicates at the 
object-language or intralinguistic level. The word “true” cannot 
exist independent from a prosentence and therefore cannot affect 
what is said in language. If extralinguistic subjects are being 
discussed, then “truth” does not factor into the discussion other 
than as a tool of language, as a member of a truth predicate 
prosentence. Prosentences that include the word “true” have 
anaphoric functions; they cannot participate as an object in 
discussion. “Truth” is neutral with respect to philosophical 
questions in the same way that pronouns are neutral with respect 
to such questions. Thus, the prosentential theory of truth is 
deflationary in its denial of truth as a distinct property.  
 
II. Robert Brandom and the Pronominal Theory of            
Reference 
In order to understand Robert Brandom‟s pronominal theory of 
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reference, it is necessary to understand his formulation of the 
prosentential theory of truth. While agreeing with Grover‟s 
analysis of prosentential theory of truth in general, Brandom 
points out an important feature of quantificational prosentences. 
The reason the prosentential theory of truth is not a 
disquotational or redundancy theory is that it does not separate 
the referring property of “that” from the referring property of 
quantificational prosentences. When the phrase “…is true” is 
understood as a prosentence forming operator, “…is true” is 
seen as forming anaphoric sentences where this phrase cannot be 
separated from the whole prosentence. This means that “…is 
true” functions as an operator in a similar way to existential and 
universal quantifiers in logic. The prosentence forming operator 
“…is true” is an anaphoric operator because all its resulting 
prosentences have an anaphoric function. Brandom‟s notion of 
the prosentence forming operator does not differ substantially 
from Grover‟s account of the prosentential theory of truth, 
because they both assign intralinguistic referring powers to 
prosentences as a whole. Using the notion of a prosentence 
forming operator is another way of understanding the role of 
“true” in prosentences. 1  Brandom‟s move to label the 
prosentential operator allows him to explain the function of 
“refers” in an analogous way to the function of “true.” In order 
to understand his analogy, however, some features of language 
must be understood.  
 There are two forms of reference, word-world or 
extralinguistic reference and word-word or intralinguistic 
reference. Anaphoric or intralinguistic reference is often taken for 
granted as being guaranteed extralinguistic reference through 
indirect description. In anaphoric chains of intralinguistic 
reference, however, some elements have a purely intralinguistic 
referential function and no independent extralinguistic reference. 
The following is an example of an anaphoric chain: Robert went to 
the store on Saturday. Marion helped him unpack what he bought. They 
realized he had forgotten something. There are three areas of 
variation to understand in tokens of anaphoric chains. Anaphoric 
tokens can be either initiating or dependent. “Robert” is an 
initiating token, while “he” is a dependent token (of “Robert”). 
Anaphoric tokens are either type-substitution-invariant types, 
meaning they do not vary in reference through an anaphoric 
chain, or cotypically nonintersubstitutable with referents varying 
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from token to token. Anaphoric tokens are also either lexically 
simple with words that are nouns, or lexically complex with 
phrases that are nouns.2 Pronouns are cotypically 
nonintersubstitutable anaphoric dependents. 
 Brandom sees “refers” as acting as a pronoun forming 
operator when its anaphoric function is understood. When 
sentences containing a form of “refers” are paraphrased such 
that “refers” only occurs inside indirect descriptions, its 
functioning can be explained in terms of a complex pronoun. 
“Refers” is applied to a token with a specified antecedent 
resulting in a lexically complex pronoun including the word 
“refers.” This means that “refers” always becomes part of a 
lexically complex, cotypically nonintersubstitutable anaphoric 
dependent. Thus “refers” is used to express anaphorically 
indirect definite descriptions. Consider the following: 
 
 Marion: Lexi’s friend seems really nice.  
 Robert: Which friend? 
Marion: I do not remember her name, but I was 
referring to the one who helped Lexi study for 
her chemistry exam. 
 
The phrase “referring to the one who helped Lexi study for her 
chemistry exam” is a lexically complex pronoun. This clarifies 
“refers‟” role as a pronoun forming operator because it always 
becomes part of a lexically complex pronoun in language. A 
similar relationship exists between “…is true” as a prosentence 
forming operator and its resulting position in language as part of 
prosentences. This means that reference is an anaphoric tool 
much like truth and that there is not an extralinguistic reference 
property. The same discussion about truth as a linguistic tool 
applies to reference as a linguistic tool.  
 
III. Anaphoric Deflationists on Truth and Reference 
It has been established that the pronominal theory of reference is 
modeled after the prosentential theory of truth, but the question 
of whether or not they necessitate one another has not yet been 
addressed. Grover explains prosentences as anaphors, making 
prosentences anaphoric referents that obtain meaning from 
antecedents. In discussing truth, therefore, Grover is able to 
avoid a discussion of extralinguistic reference. Her discussion on 
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truth centers on anaphoric, intralinguistic reference, keeping her 
discussion at the level of object-language. Truth is seen only in 
the confines of intralinguistic use and therefore it is denied that 
an extralinguistic or metalinguistic truth property exists at all. 
Grover does not deny that truth is a useful linguistic concept. 
Rather, she says that language requires a theory of meaning and 
that a prosentential “true” helps give language meaning by 
drawing attention to what sentences are being used and referred 
to in different contexts (i.e. “true” is an anaphoric tool).2  
 Grover emphasizes that the prosentential theory of truth 
does not require a specific theory about extralinguistic or 
metalinguistic reference. She goes as far as to indicate that one 
could hold the prosentential theory of truth and also hold a 
realist conception of extralinguistic reference.3 With the 
introduction of the pronominal theory of reference, however, 
Grover has to accept that an anaphoric account of truth 
necessitates an anaphoric account of reference. Grover attempts 
to isolate her anaphoric deflationary move to truth, while 
Brandom expands this idea to reference. Because Grover 
identifies anaphora in language, and her theory of truth rests on 
the existence of anaphora, she must accept all accounts of 
anaphora in language. Brandom utilizes the same logic to 
explicate the pronominal theory of reference that Grover used to 
explicate the prosentential theory of truth. Grover must therefore 
accept the pronominal theory of reference in order to maintain 
her position about truth. For this reason, I call philosophers who 
support any single anaphoric theory an anaphoric deflationist 
because they must accept all anaphoric theories. Thus, Grover 
and Brandom are anaphoric deflationists.3  
 Once the existence of intralinguistic, anaphoric referential 
relationships are revealed in language, it becomes necessary to 
identify all anaphoric linguistic concepts for any of these 
concepts to be taken seriously. By identifying “truth” as a solely 
anaphoric mechanism, Grover and Brandom invite an 
investigation as to the existence of any and all other anaphoric 
mechanisms. Brandom‟s explication of “refers” as an anaphoric 
operator necessitates that anyone who accepts the prosentential 
theory of truth must adopt the pronominal theory of reference as 
well. The question becomes not, “do anaphoric interpretations of 
„true‟ and „refers‟ require one another?”, because they do. Rather, 
what other anaphoric mechanisms in language remain to be 
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identified? Kirkham points out that the prosentential theory of 
truth leads to questions about the roles of other predicates such 
as “is surprising” and “is profound.”4 Rather than liberating us 
from false properties, anaphoric deflationists seem to trap us in 
language such that it is difficult to discern what can and cannot 
be interpreted anaphorically with a deflationary result.  
 Grover says that the prosentential theory of truth does 
not determine extralinguistic reference, but when it is 
understood that she must accept the pronominal theory of 
reference it appears that she can no longer even use the word 
“reference” meaningfully by her own anaphoric deflationary 
logic. Brandom admits that the prosentential theory of truth and 
the pronominal theory of reference deny any notions of 
substantive truth and reference, but at the same time cannot 
account for these notions. Truth and reference have been 
explained away by the anaphoric account, but it seems that the 
reason extralinguistic reference is no longer seen as a property is 
because the word “refers” can only be used intralinguistically. 
Part of the issue anaphoric deflationism must deal with in 
respect to substantive truth and reference are the words “truth” 
and “reference.” The prosentential theory of truth and the 
pronominal theory of reference are both semantic theories, but 
they only account for the words “true” and “refers.” I believe 
that when the nouns “truth” and “reference” are incorporated 
into the anaphoric account of truth and reference, at least part of 
the objection against anaphoric deflationism can be dismissed.  
The prosentential theory of truth can incorporate the 
word “truth” in terms of prosentences in the same way “true” is 
seen in terms of prosentences. When “…is true” is understood as 
a prosentence forming operator, “…is the truth” can be seen in 
the same light. The prosentences it is true and that is true can be 
reworded as it is the truth and that is the truth. Replacing “true” 
with “the truth” does not change the meaning of the prosentence, 
but rather the emphasis. Consider the following: 
 
Robert: It is true that water is composed of H20. 
 Marion: Is that really true? How do you know that? 
Robert: Scientists have proven it experimentally; that 
is how I know it is the truth.  
 
The only difference between this example and the initial version 
LAUREN HARTZELL 
25 
of this example are Robert‟s final words. Changing his last 
prosentence from “it is true” to “it is the truth” does not change 
the anaphoric functions of these prosentences. Rather, the change 
only places a greater emphasis on his belief that the antecedent to 
the prosentences, water being composed of H2O, is grounded. 
This example illustrates that “truth” is used anaphorically in 
language in the same way as “true.”  
 “Refers” is understood as always being part of a lexically 
complex pronoun in language. “Reference” can be understood in 
the same way, though it will usually be a member of even more 
complex pronouns. Consider the following: 
 
Marion: Lexi’s friend seems really nice.  
 Robert: Which friend? 
Marion: I do not remember her name, but I was making 
a reference to the one who helped Lexi study for 
her chemistry exam. 
 
The lexically complex pronoun in which “referring” is used in 
the first instance of this example is manipulated such that 
“reference” is used here instead. This enables the pronominal 
theory of reference to include both “reference” and forms of 
“refers.” The anaphoric function of the complex pronoun is the 
same in each instance of this example; it is merely expressed with 
different words.  
With the words “truth” and “reference” incorporated into 
anaphoric deflationism, the argument for substantive truth and 
reference becomes even weaker. Previously anaphoric 
deflationary accounts failed to explain the words “truth” and 
“reference” in language because they only explained forms of 
“true” and “refers.” “Truth” and “reference” indicate substantive 
properties more than “true” and “refers” do, because they are the 
primary nominal concepts from which their cognates develop. 
With the primary linguistic concepts of truth and reference 
explained as anaphoric linguistic tools, the case against the 
existence of truth and reference as metaphysical properties is 
strengthened.  
It seems unfair, however, that the anaphoric deflationary 
argument against discussion of substantive truth and reference 
properties is the fact that the words “truth” and “reference” used 
in these discussions are not valid terms to use when discussing 
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extralinguistic notions. Anaphoric deflationism seems to trap us 
in intralinguistic language. In other words, my worry is that the 
premise of anaphoric deflationism, the existence of anaphora in 
language, does not allow for coherent arguments against 
anaphoric deflationism, since no one is able to escape language 
and its inherent anaphors. It is a contradiction to say that 
something extralinguistic gives meaning to linguistic concepts 
when the word we use for this meaning relationship has an 
anaphoric function in language. Anaphoric deflationism does not 
address substantive truth and reference notions, but its reason 
for doing this is part of its premise.  
 
Notes 
1 See Grover, 1992 for a full account of the prosentential theory of truth, and 
Grover, 2001 for an updated condensed version of the theory. 
2 See Brandom, 1994, chapter 5, section III-4. 
3 See Brandom, 1984, section II.  
4 See Grover, 1990 and Grover, 1992.  
5 Grover, 1992: 34.  
6 It may be possible for Grover to accept a non-deflationary account of 
extralinguistic reference if this theory did not contain “reference vocabulary” 
that could be interpreted anaphorically. As indicated later in this paper, 
however, it may not be possible to use any “reference vocabulary” in a non-
anaphoric way.  
7 Kirkham, 1992: 328-329.  
 
Bibliography 
Brandom, R. 1984. “Reference Explained Away.” Journal of Philosophy 
 81, no. 9: 469-492.  
Brandom, R. 1987. “Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk.” In 
 Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume XII: Realism and Antireal
 ism, ed. P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, pp. 75-94. Min
 neapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Brandom, R. 1994. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discur
 sive Commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Grover, D. 1990. “Truth and Language-World Connections.” Journal of 
 Philosophy 87, no. 12: 671-687.  
Grover, D. 1992. A Prosentential Theory of Truth. Princeton: Princeton 
 University Press. 
Grover, D. 2001. “The Prosentential Theory: Further Reflections on Lo
 cating Our Interest in Truth.” In The Nature of Truth: Classic and 
 Contemporary Perspectives, ed. M. Lynch, pp. 505-526. Cam
 bridge: MIT Press. 
Kirkham, R. 1992. Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: 
 MIT Press.  
LAUREN HARTZELL 
